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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
BOOK REVIEW
______________________________________________________________

ONE OF THE GOOD GUYS: THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE
—REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94 YEARS
Jamal Greene*
John Paul Stevens’s first published judicial opinion was a
dissent. 1 He joined the Seventh Circuit a few days after the court
issued its opinion in Groppi v. Leslie, 2 and dissented soon
afterward when the court upheld that decision on rehearing.
Wilbur Pell, who until Stevens joined was the only Republican
among the Seventh Circuit’s seven active judges, wrote both
Groppi opinions. 3 Yet Stevens, brand new to the court, dissented
from Pell’s opinion on rehearing. 4

*Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Law Clerk to the Honorable John Paul
Stevens, United States Supreme Court, 2006–07.
1. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94
YEARS 111 (2019).
2. 436 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1970), aff’d on reh’g, 436 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1971). Groppi, a
Milwaukee priest and civil rights activist, had led 1,000 people in a raucous sit-in at the
Wisconsin Assembly to protest planned welfare cuts. See State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 171
N.W.2d 192 (Wis. 1969). Groppi was cited without prior notice for legislative contempt
and given a six-month prison sentence, receiving no opportunity to contest the charge. He
won his subsequent federal habeas case in the district court but lost on appeal at the
Seventh Circuit.
3. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 109–10.
4. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 109.
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There was no reason to think Father Groppi, who was
arrested for leading a demonstration that interrupted the
Wisconsin Assembly’s work, was innocent of legislative
contempt, but Stevens believed the Fourteenth Amendment
insisted on certain procedural protections before a person’s
liberty could be denied, whether by a court or a legislature. “At
the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies
to government officials an exceptional position before the law
and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen,” Stevens wrote, quoting Justice
Brandeis. 5 “And in the development of our liberty,” he
continued, “insistence upon procedural regularity has been a
large factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in
its enforcement, to means which shock the common man’s sense
of decency and fair play.” 6 Stevens couldn’t persuade his
colleagues, but the Supreme Court eventually granted cert in
Father Groppi’s case and unanimously adopted Stevens’s
position. 7
Biography is an imperfect predictor of a judge’s character
and priorities. On reading Justice Stevens’s 2019 memoir,
published a month after his ninety-ninth birthday and two
months before his death, one is overwhelmed at once with the
privilege that attended Stevens’s childhood. He was born in
1920 into a family of hoteliers. His grandfather, J.W. Stevens,
founded the Illinois Life Insurance Company and owned the
tony La Salle Hotel in the Chicago Loop. His father, Ernest, ran
the Stevens Hotel, the largest in the world when it opened in
1926, and was for a time one of Chicago’s wealthiest men. 8
But a memoir that opens to audiences with Amelia Earhart
and Charles Lindbergh, summers at the vacation estate in
Lakeside, Michigan, and trips to World Series games at Wrigley
5. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., Swygert, C.J. &
Kiley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). Stevens would be appointed to the
Brandeis seat five years later.
6. Id.
7. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1971).
8. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 7. It is sometimes said of the scions of the wealthy that
they have their own money. John Paul Stevens had his own swag: Guests at the opening
banquet of the Stevens Hotel received gifts of bronze bookends that featured little John
Paul and one of his brothers, both naked, next to a large fish. Id. at 10.
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Field—including, famously, the one at which Babe Ruth is said
(including by Stevens) to have called his home run 9—ends with
a lengthy, heartfelt dissent from the Supreme Court’s refusal to
permit Congress to regulate the influence of big money on
elections. Stevens was no populist but he cared deeply about the
little guy. He was no iconoclast but he wrote more dissents than
any Justice in history. He was the only WASP on the Court he
retired from, and the only Justice who wore a bowtie to work,
but he was among the least wed to establishment thinking.
Why?
He doesn’t say, not directly anyway. Deep introspection
isn’t the aim here; Stevens mostly sticks to the facts, but there
are hints. The book is effectively laid out in two acts. The first
quarter or so is more conventionally autobiographical, telling of
Stevens’s childhood and first home on Blackstone (!) Avenue,
his college years at the University of Chicago, his Navy service
as a codebreaker at Pearl Harbor, his law school days at
Northwestern, his clerkship with Justice Rutledge, his time in
practice as a successful antitrust lawyer, and his five-year stint
as an appellate judge.
The most bracing passages, and perhaps the most telling,
relate to the scandal that engulfed Stevens’s father, and the
events that followed. In 1933, the Cook County state’s attorney
charged Ernest Stevens, his brother, and his father with
embezzling more than $1 million in connection with a loan the
Stevens Hotel obtained from J.W.’s company. 10 Ernest’s
conviction was eventually overturned for insufficiency of
evidence. 11 In the meantime, though, two terrifying incidents
shattered whatever sense of security John Paul’s wealth and
social stature might have supplied him. First, the family
chauffeur, Orson Washburne, was kidnapped at gunpoint and
interrogated about the location of cash believed to be stashed in
the Stevens’s home. 12 Shortly thereafter, four armed men
claiming to be Chicago police officers burst into the Stevens
family home one evening. They ransacked the place, threatened
to “mow down” the family and, before leaving, promised
9. Id. at 10–11, 12, 18.
10. Id. at 19.
11. Id. at 24.
12. Id. at 19–20.
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reprisals against John Paul and his brother if anyone ratted them
out. 13
Whether or not Ernest Stevens was guilty of any crimes,
John Paul clearly believed his father had been wrongfully
convicted. And whatever the identities of the men who invaded
the Stevens home just after that Saturday dinner, Stevens reveals
lingering suspicion that they might well have had day jobs as
Chicago police officers. Much later in life, just before his
appointment to the Seventh Circuit, Stevens led a corruption
investigation into members of the Illinois Supreme Court. All of
which is to say that Stevens’s personal engagements with the
criminal justice system could not have inspired unqualified
confidence in individual police officers, prosecutors, and judges.
Yet, his father was acquitted, and Stevens’s investigation led to
the resignation of two state Supreme Court Justices. There are
bad guys who wield power within the system, but sometimes the
good guys win.
The book’s much longer second act offers a term-by-term
recounting of Stevens’s thirty-five-year tenure as a Supreme
Court Justice. In this sense this book serves as a valuable trial
version of Justice Stevens’s papers. No personal records have
been released from any Justice for the period after Justice
Blackmun’s retirement in 1994, and so Justice Stevens gives the
desperate researcher a trailer for what they will find when his
actual papers become available. 14 Like any good trailer, it
contains few spoilers, but there are at least three reveals I view
as significant.
The first and perhaps most significant revelation has
nothing to do with the cases but rather with the circumstances
surrounding Justice Stevens’s nomination and confirmation.
Stevens was nominated in November 1975 and was confirmed
in just nineteen days by a Senate that had a filibuster-proof
Democratic majority. In that sense, his confirmation process
seems to harken to an earlier time in which Supreme Court
nominations were far less a subject of partisan politics.
13. Id. at 21.
14. See Susan David deMaine, Access to the Justices’ Papers: A Better Balance, 110 L.
LIBRARY J. 185 (2018). Per the terms of Justice Stevens’s gift to the Library of Congress,
his papers relating to the period prior to October 2005 are scheduled to become public in
October 2020. The remainder will be released in 2030. See id. at 219.
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(Stevens’s aside that he shared a glass of bourbon with
Mississippi Senator James Eastland 15 in the middle of his
confirmation hearing feels straight out of Mad Men.) And yet,
Stevens reveals that Illinois Senator Chuck Percy—a friend
since their college days at the University of Chicago 16—told
him that Senate Democrats made clear that “if [Stevens] were
not confirmed before the end of the year, they would delay the
process . . . until after the next presidential election.” 17
This tactic might sound familiar. After Justice Antonin
Scalia’s death in February 2016, Senate Republicans refused to
hold a hearing on President Obama’s nomination of Merrick
Garland, the D.C. Circuit’s well-respected chief judge, to fill the
seat. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell invoked what he
said was a norm of the Senate not filling a Supreme Court seat
in an election year. 18 Democrats cried foul, arguing that there
was no such norm—to cite two examples, Louis Brandeis was
nominated and seated in 1916, and Anthony Kennedy wasn’t
confirmed until February 1988. 19 Republicans countered that the
norm was limited to occasions in which the Senate was
controlled by the opposition (as it wasn’t for the Brandeis
nomination) and in which the vacancy arose during the election
year (as it didn’t for the Kennedy nomination). 20
I am unaware of anyone in the course of this debate having
referred to the Stevens nomination as a relevant precedent. But
surely Republicans would have made great hay of a prior
Democratic Senate’s promise to hold up a Republican
president’s uncontroversial nominee solely because the election
calendar was about to turn—Stevens was confirmed
unanimously just before Christmas, after all of five minutes of

15. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 131–32.
16. Id. at 107. Percy had recommended Stevens for the Seventh Circuit opening five
years before. Id. at 107–08.
17. Id. at 129.
18. See, e.g., Dave Boyer, Senate Republicans Tell Obama: No Hearings for Supreme
Court Nominee, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2016.
19. See id.; Timothy S. Heubner, In Court Fight, History Backs Obama, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2016, at A19.
20. See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes & Kristina Peterson, Hearings for a Court Pick Are
Ruled Out by GOP, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2016, at A2.
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debate. 21 It seems distinctly possible that, by 2016, the
machinations around the Stevens nomination were unknown to,
or not remembered by, anyone but Justice Stevens himself.
Three other noteworthy revelations concern two of the most
controversial cases of Justice Stevens’s tenure, both decided
shortly before he retired. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 22 the
Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to keep a handgun in the District. In the book, Justice
Stevens calls Heller the most “clearly incorrect” decision of his
time on the Court.23 The fact that he had once been held at
gunpoint in his own home surely adds some heft to that charge,
but he’s made similar charges before. 24 Of greater note is a
behind-the-scenes tease that might well bear upon the current
state of Second Amendment litigation. Stevens writes that he
circulated his Heller dissent before Justice Scalia circulated
what would become the majority opinion. He performed this
unusual order of operations in order to persuade Justice
Kennedy or Justice Thomas to change his vote. He didn’t
succeed, of course, but he thought he might have pushed Justice
Kennedy to “insist[] on some important changes” to the majority
opinion before signing on. 25
Justice Stevens doesn’t identify those changes, but it has
long been suspected that portions of Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion were inserted reluctantly. Specifically, Justice Scalia
wrote that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.” 26 This curious disclaimer lingers in
21. See Lesley Oelsner, Senate Confirms Stevens, 98-0, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1975, at
A1.
22. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 482.
24. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS 126 (2014); John Paul Stevens, Op-Ed,
Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2018, available at https://www.ny
times.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-amendment.html.
25. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 485–87 (describing the review of historical sources that
preceded Stevens’s writing of his opinion and also quoting the cover memorandum
circulated with his draft opinion).
26. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
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the opinion unsupported by any explanation or analysis. Which
mental illnesses disqualify Americans from gun ownership?
Why isn’t the District of Columbia, the seat of the federal
government, a “sensitive place”? If commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment, why aren’t gun sales
protected by the Second? Justice Stevens’s confirmation that
Justice Kennedy requested significant changes to the opinion
offers a likely explanation for this language.
Moreover, the fact that securing Justice Kennedy’s join
required some qualifications to the right recognized in Heller
isn’t just a matter of legal historical trivia but might be relevant
to modern Second Amendment litigation. It is notable that, with
one prominent exception, 27 the Court did not take any Second
Amendment cases during the remainder of Justice Kennedy’s
tenure. Then, barely three months after Kennedy’s replacement,
Brett Kavanaugh, was seated, the Court granted cert in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York,28 a
challenge to a unique city regulation involving the transport
conditions imposed upon gun owners who held “premises”
licenses, but not “carry” licenses. 29 Justice Kennedy seems to
have been holding back the tide.
An additional bit of red meat for Court watchers emerges
from Justice Stevens’s discussion of Citizens United v. FEC.30
The case was decided in Stevens’s last Term on the Court—
indeed, the Justice’s trouble reading his dissent in the case from
the bench alerted him to a minor stroke he had suffered and led
to his decision to retire. 31 The Citizens United Court struck
down a federal ban on certain election-related expenditures
funded out of the general treasury funds of a corporation or
union, overturning two earlier decisions in the process. 32 Jeffrey
Toobin reported in 2012 that Chief Justice Roberts had
originally wanted to issue a narrow decision refusing to apply

27. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
28. ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
29. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (No. 18-280) (Jan. 22, 2019).
30. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
31. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 503.
32. Citizens United overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), and portions of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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the expenditure ban to Citizens United, an ideological nonprofit
seeking to release a movie through video on demand, as distinct
from a television advertisement. 33 On Toobin’s telling, Justice
Kennedy circulated a broader concurring opinion that would
reach the constitutional question and eventually attracted
significant support among the Court’s conservatives. 34 Roberts’s
decision to allow Kennedy’s opinion to be the majority opinion
prompted a virulent dissent by Justice David Souter, who
objected to striking down Congress’s work on its face without
proper briefing and argument. 35 Justice Souter’s dissent, Toobin
says, cowed Roberts into setting the case for reargument the
following term. 36 Justice Stevens says nothing of this reporting
but he does confirm that Justice Souter circulated a dissent after
the first argument. Indeed, he says his own dissent from the
eventual decision drew heavily on Justice Souter’s.
I clerked for Justice Stevens during the Supreme Court
Term that began in October 2006, three years before he retired. I
am aware of the risk of hagiography in assessing the work of a
revered mentor, especially one who passed so recently. Still, I
am confident in reporting that, in three important respects,
Justice Stevens was the same principled man who had admirably
dissented in Father Groppi’s case nearly four decades earlier.
First, Justice Stevens firmly believed that each case stood
on its own feet. “General propositions do not decide concrete
cases,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in his famous
Lochner dissent. “The decision will depend on a judgment or
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.” 37 The
law insists on every case being placed in its own context; this is
indeed what principled decisionmaking requires. We often think
of principles as unbending but, as the constitutional theorist
Robert Alexy has written, principles are “optimization
requirements” that, through the exercise of reasoned judgment,

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 167 (2012).
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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must accommodate competing principles and facts about the
world. 38
Justice Stevens’s longstanding suspicion of the Court’s
multi-tiered approach to the Equal Protection Clause reflects this
orientation toward legal standards over hard-and-fast rules. Less
than a year into his tenure, the Court heard Craig v. Boren, 39 a
challenge to an Oklahoma drinking-age law that discriminated
against men. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Craig
announced the use of “intermediate” scrutiny for laws that
discriminate on the basis of sex. Justice Stevens’s concurring
opinion began:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every
State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to
apply one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. . . . I am inclined to believe that
what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal
protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court
has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a
single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. I also
suspect that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating
particular decisions may contribute more to an
identification of that standard than an attempt to articulate
it in all-encompassing terms. 40

This approach to equal protection cases perhaps allowed
Justice Stevens to see factual distinctions that others miss, such
as his often underappreciated embrace of forward-looking but
not remedial race-based affirmative action. 41 Stevens credits his
Northwestern legal education under Dean Leon Green for his
strong orientation toward “facts and procedure instead of
generally applicable substantive rules.” 42 Still, one gets the
sense from the book that Stevens’s appreciation for common

38. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 47–48 (Julius Rivers
trans., 2002).
39. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
40. Id. at 211–12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 538–39 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
42. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 54.
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sense over formalisms is more innate than acculturated. One got
the same sense in person.
A second respect in which Father Groppi’s case seemed to
personify Justice Stevens more broadly is in its display of his
independence. Not only was it a dissent in his first published
judicial opinion but it was a dissent in a case that, Stevens notes,
he was warned by a fellow judge would have political
implications affecting who was considered for the Supreme
Court. 43 It’s unlikely that Stevens’s dissent earned him plaudits
from Richard Nixon, but he dissented all the same.
Much as Justice Stevens insisted that each case must stand
on its own feet, he also wanted judges to make their own
decisions. If judges disagreed with the dispositions in particular
cases, their duty was not to go along to get along but rather to
write separately and explain what the majority got wrong.
Indeed, perhaps the single most consequential decision Justice
Stevens authored, his opinion for the Court in Sony Corporation
of America v. Universal City Studios, began as a dissent. 44 In
Sony, the so-called “Betamax” case, the Court held that using a
home recording device to make a copy of a television show for
private, noncommercial use did not violate the copyright law.
Justice Stevens’s dissent helped prompt the Court to set the case
for reargument, leading Justice O’Connor to switch her vote and
make the dissent a majority opinion. 45
Justice Stevens’s practices in chambers were calculated to
preserve his independence. Early on, for example, he declined
Chief Justice Burger’s invitation to join the “cert pool,” a system
in which the clerks of participating Justices divide the petitions
and write a shared memo summarizing the case and offering a
recommendation on whether it should be granted or denied. 46
Justice Stevens borrowed his preference for reading the papers
in his own chambers from Justice Rutledge, who did not trust
Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s clerks fairly to handle in forma
pauperis petitions, those from (typically pro se) petitioners who

43. Id. at 111.
44. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); STEVENS,
supra note 1, at 200–01.
45. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 200–01.
46. Id. at 137–38.
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had obtained waivers of the filing fee. 47 In one such petition that
Vinson’s clerks had recommended be denied, the Rutledge
chambers insisted on a response from the government and the
case resulted in a confession of error and a summary reversal. 48
Justice Stevens reveals that something similar happened during
his own tenure, in BMW of North America v. Gore, 49 a case
limiting the scope of punitive damages under the Due Process
Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not put the case on the list
for discussion at the Justices’ conference, but the Stevens
chambers added it to the list. 50 It became a grant and then a
reversal. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. 51
In addition to exempting himself from the cert pool, Justice
Stevens also eschewed “bench memos” from his law clerks—he
preferred to read the papers on his own and discuss the cases
orally with his clerks before argument—and he typically wrote
the first drafts of his opinions. As with his refusal to rely on
shared cert memos from other chambers, both practices mirrored
those of Justice Rutledge. 52 Writing the first draft helped to
ensure that he was comfortable with his reasoning before falling
under the influence of a skilled writer. It also trained his
attention on the facts of the case. The book includes the candid,
indeed chilling, admission that his outsourcing of the statement
of facts in Jurek v. Texas, 53 one of five cases through which the
Court lifted its moratorium on the death penalty, led him
erroneously to vote to affirm the capital sentence. 54
A third defining characteristic of Justice Stevens, in
addition to his attention to facts and his independence, is
somewhat more difficult to articulate with precision but leaps
off the pages of his book and would be easily recognized by all
who knew him. Let’s call it “professionalism.” A casual
47. Id. at 62–63.
48. Id. at 63; see Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (per curiam).
49. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
50. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 138.
51. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 (explaining that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined
in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose” (footnote omitted)).
52. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 62–63.
53. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
54. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 143.
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observer could easily accuse Stevens of being a kind of naïf.
Notably, in a memoir that runs more than 500 pages and is
overwhelmingly devoted to his time on an increasingly polarized
Supreme Court, Justice Stevens never—not once—accuses his
colleagues of partisanship. He also notes that, consistent with his
commitment to the independence of each Justice, he almost
never visited his colleagues to try to persuade them to join his
opinions. 55 And so it is easy to get the impression of the courtly
man in a bowtie and spectacles studying the facts and plugging
away one case at a time while clever partisan plots swirl about
him, over his head.
Although his optimism in chambers was striking, I think it
would be quite wrong to view Justice Stevens’s generosity
toward his colleagues as guilelessness. This was, after all, a man
whose father once, successfully, asked Al Capone to stop crime
in Chicago as a personal favor. 56 The memoir gives a hint that
Justice Stevens knew exactly what was happening to the Court.
The book includes a lengthy discussion of Bush v. Gore, 57 in
which the Court halted a manual recount of presidential ballots
cast in Florida in 2000, effectively handing the election to
George W. Bush. Among the several problems Justice Stevens
found with the majority’s approach, the one that clearly stuck
with him was the unspoken assumption that the judges on the
Florida Supreme Court who had ordered the recount were
partisan operatives. He thus ended his unusually pointed dissent
with these words:
The endorsement of that position by the majority of this
Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal
of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence
in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one
day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted
by today’s decision. One thing, however, is certain.
Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election,

55. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 205. One notable exception is Chevron USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), his most cited opinion, which he lobbied
Justice Brennan to join and therefore make the opinion unanimous. See id.
56. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 7.
57. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule
of law. 58

As if to actively perform that shaken confidence, for two of
the cases discussed in the remainder of the chapter on the
October 2000 Term and for one case from the following term,
Justice Stevens refers to the Court as “the five-justice majority”
from Bush v. Gore. 59 The three cases had nothing to do with
election law. One involved the Clean Water Act, 60 another the
Federal Arbitration Act, 61 and a third the availability of an
implied constitutional damages remedy. 62 Observers of the
Court will recognize these areas of law as having been in the
crosshairs of legal conservatives over the last several decades.
Affiliating the conservative decisions in these cases with Bush v.
Gore is as close to a wink at the camera as Justice Stevens gives
in his memoir.
The professionalism one observes in Justice Stevens
doesn’t, then, speak to naiveté so much as to the kind of role
awareness he urged his colleagues to maintain in Bush v. Gore.
One observes something similar in Stevens’s caginess about his
own abilities. The book reads at times almost as a Forrest Gump
for the elite lawyer class. Here he is being invited fresh out of
college, as if at random, to help break the Japanese naval code. 63
And there he is winning a clerkship with Justice Rutledge on a
coin flip. 64 He’s casually asked to be general counsel to Sears
after conducting a routine deposition of one of the company’s
senior officers. 65 (He declined.) Byron White wants him to run
the Justice Department’s antitrust division, Stevens suggests,
because they had met in Hawaii during the war. 66 He acts
surprised, just off his bombshell investigation into the Illinois
Supreme Court and his election as vice president of the Chicago
58. Id. at 128–29 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer JJ., dissenting).
59. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 374, 377, 381.
60. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
61. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
62. Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
63. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 35.
64. See id. at 58–59.
65. See id. at 85.
66. See id. at 99.
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Bar Association, when Senator Percy floats him for the Seventh
Circuit. 67
Don’t be fooled. Justice Stevens was as aware of his
brilliance as he was of his privilege. But he let it speak for itself.
Don’t toot your own horn, don’t disparage others, trust your
judgment, do your job, and you can be one of the good guys.

67. See id. at 106–08.

